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INTRODUCTION 
Pursuant to Rule 24(c), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
Plaintiff takes this opportunity to address facts and arguments 
raised by Defendant in his Brief of the Appellee. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant has misstated some critical facts in his Brief. 
Defendant has also provided no legal support for the trial court's 
abuse of discretion in granting Defendant's Motion in Limine while 
denying Plaintiff's Motion for Continuance. Because of the abuse 
of discretion involved, the Order entered by the trial court-
October 7, 1991, should be reversed. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Defendant has Misstated Some Critical Facts in his Brief. 
Defendant has asserted in his Brief that the witness list 
naming Plaintiff's expert was not transmitted to Defendant's 
counsel by facsimile on August 19, 1992, stating that Plaintiff's 
factual account of such transmission was incorrect. Upon receipt 
of Defendant's Brief, counsel undersigned reviewed his file on this 
matter once again, to ascertain the truthfulness of Defendant's 
claim, and through such procedure, counsel undersigned discovered 
that Defendant is correct in this assertion. Although counsel 
undersigned attempted to transmit the witness list to Defendant's 
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counsel on August 19, 1991, by facsimile, counsel undersigned was 
unable to do so because the facsimile equipment located at the 
office of Plaintiff's counsel was not compatible with the facsimile 
equipment located at the office of Defendant's counsel. 
However, when counsel undersigned was unable to communicate 
the witness list to Defendant's counsel by facsimile, desiring that 
the information be received by Defendant's counsel as soon as 
possible, Defendant's counsel personally delivered the witness list 
to the main Salt Lake City post office located at 1769 W. 2100 S. 
in Salt Lake City, by 6:00 p.m. on August 19, 1991. Based upon 
past experience, the witness list would have been delivered to 
Defendant's counsel's office on August 20, 1991. Based upon past 
experience, it is absolutely impossible that the witness list not 
arrive at the office of Defendant's counsel until August 22, 1992, 
as alleged by Defendant in his Brief. 
An additional fact that Defendant implies in his Brief is that 
Plaintiff did not make a Motion for Continuance until Monday, 
August 26, 1991, the morning of trial. On the contrary, 
Plaintiff's counsel made a motion for continuance during the 
telephone conference on Friday, August 23, 1991. However, 
Plaintiff is unable to establish this fact in the record, as the 
transcript of the telephone hearing has been inconveniently 
misplaced or erased. This is precisely the missing evidence from 
this hearing that would support Plaintiff's position, justifying 
the reversal of the Order entered October 7, 1991. 
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In paragraph 5 of the Statement of Facts in Defendant's Brief, 
he misstates that "on Friday, April 5, 1991 Dr. Larsen advised them 
he would not testify as an expert witness against Dr. Dickerson, or 
at least would not give them the opinions they desired." This is 
a total misstatement of fact. Dr. Larsen felt at the time, and 
still does to Plaintiff's knowledge, that Dr. Dickerson committed 
dental malpractice. The only reason Dr. Larsen reneged on his 
agreement to be Plaintiff's expert was his fear that testifying 
against a local dentist might have an adverse effect on his own 
practice. Another misstatement of fact is found in paragraph 10 of 
the Statement of Facts in Defendant's Brief, in which Defendant 
claims that the mediation conference was a culmination of the 
settlement discussions. There is absolutely no evidence on the 
record that the parties agreed that this was the culmination of 
settlement efforts. On the contrary, the evidence reflects that 
Plaintiff's understanding was just the opposite. 
Finally, in paragraph 16 of his Statement of Facts, Defendant 
misstates that "plaintiff suggested and agreed that the trial court 
should dismiss the case rather than have plaintiff present her case 
without expert testimony and have the trial court direct a verdict 
against her." It is true that Judge West intended to direct a 
verdict against Plaintiff if she put on her case without expert 
testimony. However, Plaintiff never suggested or agreed that for 
that reason the case should be dismissed with prejudice. 
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II. Defendant's Brief has Provided no Legal Support of 
the Trial Court's Abuse of Discretion in Granting 
Defendant's Motion in Limine While Denying Plaintiff's 
Motion for Continuance. 
The only legal precedent which Defendant has cited in his 
Brief in an effort to support the trial court's abuse of discretion 
is an old case from the California Court of Appeals, Kalmus v. 
Kalmus, 230 P.2d 57 (Ct. App. Cal. 1951). In Kalmus, the Plaintiff 
sought a continuance for two reasons, illness and because another 
action was currently pending in a different state on the matter. 
In that case, the plaintiff's Motion for Continuance was denied as 
a result of evidence establishing that her illness was insufficient 
to preclude her travel to California, and that the second action in-
Massachusetts was only filed by the plaintiff after she received an 
adverse ruling in the California case filed earlier. _Id. at 62-64. 
Thus, Kalmus is factually totally dissimilar from the case at bar. 
Notwithstanding the dissimilarity, the Kalmus opinion, as 
quoted by Defendant in his Brief, supports Plaintiff's appeal. In 
Kalmus, the court stated that cases should be "determined with as 
great promptness as the exigencies of the case will permit." Id. 
at 63. In the case at bar, a continuance for a short period of 
time, for instance two weeks, to allow Defendant to depose 
Plaintiff's expert, in a case which had been pending for two years, 
should be considered prompt. Since the exigencies of the case at 
bar were such that the denial of such a short delay in the 
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trial has caused extreme prejudice to Plaintiff, the lower court 
should have granted Plaintiff's Motion for Continuance. 
In his brief, Defendant goes on to cite two additional cases 
from Colorado and one from Alaska in an effort to support the trial 
court's abuse of discretion. In the first case, In re Estate of 
Gardner, 505 P. 2d 50 (Ct. App. Colo. 1972), the Colorado Court of 
Appeals upheld the trial court's refusal to allow the testimony of 
a witness who was not identified until the trial had commenced. 
Id. at 51-52. In Salazar v. Ehmann, 505 P.2d 387 (Ct. App. Colo. 
1972), the same court found no abuse of discretion when the trial 
court refused to allow a police officer to testify who also had not 
been identified until the commencement of trial. JA. at 390. The 
identical issue is discussed by the Alaska Supreme Court in Bertram 
v. Harris, 423 P.2d 909, 917 (Alaska 1967). 
None of the above cases involve the denial of a Motion for 
Continuance in conjunction with the grant of a Motion in Limine 
precluding the testimony of witnesses. In addition, the decision 
in the cases cited above to preclude testimony of certain witnesses 
did not have the result of throwing the plaintiff out of court, 
denying the plaintiff in those cases the opportunity to present his 
or her case to the court. For that reason, none of the three cases 
cited above is dispositive in the situation at bar. Indeed, 
Plaintiff submits to this court that Defendant's inability to find 
legal support for the trial court's determination in this case is 
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easily explained. It is Plaintiff's belief that no trial court has 
ever abused its discretion in this manner, the appellate report of 
which would provide precedent for Defendant's position. 
On pages 16 and 17 of his Brief, Defendant discusses the 
factors which the trial court allegedly considered in denying 
Plaintiff's Motion for Continuance. One of these factors is 
totally irrelevant to the denial of the Motion for Continuance, 
i.e. the time available, between Plaintiff's designation of 
witnesses and the trial, for Defendant to take depositions. While 
this factor is relevant in the court's determination on Defendant's 
Motion in Limine, such factor has no bearing whatsoever on the 
determination of a Motion for Continuance. An examination of some 
of the other factors Defendant has cited will help illuminate the 
trial court's abuse of discretion in denying Plaintiff's Motion for 
Continuance. 
Defendant places great emphasis on Plaintiff's "violation" of 
the order of the lower court to designate expert witnesses by April 
19, 1991, as a determining factor in the lower court's denial of 
Plaintiff's second Motion for Continuance. From the transcript of 
the proceeding on August 26, 1991, it appears that the trial court 
placed great emphasis on this factor as well. This emphasis would 
be well placed, except for the fact that Defendant reached an 
agreement with Plaintiff that she would not be required to comply 
with that order until settlement negotiations failed. It is no 
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wonder that Defendant opposed so vigorously Plaintiff's Motion to 
Supplement the Record on Appeal to include the letter confirming 
this arrangement. Defendant should not be allowed to enter into 
such an agreement, and then to have Plaintiff's cause of action 
dismissed with prejudice because the agreement "violated" the court 
order. Due to this agreement, the trial court abused its 
discretion in factoring this "violation" into its determination to 
deny Plaintiff's Motion for Continuance. 
Defendant also argues that, even if an agreement was reached, 
it terminated at the time the mediation conference was held. 
However, there is absolutely no evidence in the record of the 
parties' agreement that the mediation conference was the 
culmination of settlement efforts. On the contrary, the record 
reveals that Plaintiff never considered the mediation conference to 
be the culmination of settlement negotiations. Thus, Plaintiff's 
efforts to name her expert witness two weeks prior to trial was in 
accord with the agreement between the parties, and due to 
Defendant's refusal to cooperate, Plaintiff's Motion for 
Continuance should have been granted. 
Defendant also states that a factor the lower court used in 
denying the Motion for Continuance was the "extreme prejudice" that 
the grant of the Motion would have had upon Defendant. Again, 
there is absolutely no evidence in the record of any prejudice, let 
alone any extreme prejudice, which would have resulted to Defendant 
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by a short continuance of the trial of this matter. If any party 
to this action has been extremely prejudiced, it is obviously 
Plaintiff, by the trial court's denial of her Motion for 
Continuance, precluding her from her day in court. Based upon the 
factors which the trial court should have applied in its 
determination of Plaintiff's Motion for Continuance, the Motion 
should have been granted. 
On the morning of trial, August 26, 1991, the lower court also 
expressed a judicial economy argument against granting the Motion 
for Continuance, stating that the Motion should have been brought 
earlier. However, the Motion was not brought on the morning of 
trial but was brought the previous Friday, and if the Motion had 
been granted at that time, it would have allowed the clerk of the 
lower court sufficient time to contact the panel of proposed jurors 
who were scheduled to arrive at the court Monday morning. The 
missing transcript of the telephone hearing on Friday, August 23, 
1991, might reveal the trial court's motivation in taking 
Plaintiff's Motion for Continuance under advisement at that time, 
whether it was an attempt to force the parties to settle or simply 
a power play by a Circuit Court Judge sitting pro tern on the 
District Court bench. Unfortunately, this court is now handicapped 
on this issue, because the record of the Friday telephone hearing 
is lost. 
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Defendant's argument that the missing transcript must be 
presumed to support the lower court's decision, citing Mascaro v. 
Davis, 741 P. 2d 938 (Utah 1987), is misplaced. Under Mascaro, 
missing portions of the record are presumed to support the trial 
court's determination only when the items are missing from the 
record as a result of the fault of one of the parties. _Id. at 943. 
Mascaro does not stand for the proposition that missing items in 
the record, which are missing due to the fault of the court, are 
presumed to support the trial court's determination. On the 
contrary, in the case at bar, the missing transcript of the 
telephone hearing, whether due to the negligence or intentional 
conduct of the lower court, strongly supports the reversal of trie 
trial court's Order dated October 7, 1991. 
Defendant's final argument in his Brief is that a dismissal 
without prejudice in this case would have been senseless. 
Plaintiff strongly disagrees that such a ruling would have been the 
equivalent of a continuance, because Plaintiff would have been 
required to refile and commence her lawsuit over again which, 
although prejudicial to her, would still have allowed her a day in 
court. On the contrary, the lower court abused its discretion in 
applying the harsh and permanent remedy of a dismissal with 
prejudice. 
Defendant has wholly failed in his Brief to refute or 
distinguish the holding of the Utah Supreme Court in Christenson v. 
Jewkes, 761 P. 2d 1375 (Utah 1988), in which the Court found that it 
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was not an abuse of discretion to allow testimony of an expert who 
was designated only five days before trial, but who was made 
available for interview or deposition, when the other party simply 
chose not to take advantage of either option. .Id., at 1377-78. The 
factual similarities between Christenson and the case at bar lend 
great support to Plaintiff's appeal hereunder. In granting 
Plaintiff's Motion in Limine, precluding any expert testimony on 
behalf of Plaintiff, while denying Plaintiff's request for a short 
continuance, the trial court abused its discretion, and Plaintiff 
should be entitled to her day in court. 
CONCLUSION 
For the additional reasons set forth above, as well as those 
contained in Plaintiff's original Brief, Plaintiff respectfully 
requests that this court reverse the Order of the trial court 
entered October 7, 1991, denying her Motion for Continuance and 
dismissing this action with prejudice, remanding the matter back to 
the trial court to schedule a new trial date. 
DATED this 3 y day of May, 1991. 
)UGLAS M. DURBANO "' DOU
WALTER T. MERRILL 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/ 
Appellant 
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